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Highlights
• The foundation that oversees the setting of International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) has proposed minor changes to its statute or ‘Constitution’,
some of which are to be welcomed. 
• But a broader strategic readjustment is necessary if the drift that has seen
IFRS lose some of the support it enjoyed from the global investment
community, its most crucial group of stakeholders, is to be reversed.
• The foundation should through its oversight bodies empower and
appropriately represent the global investment community. 
• ‘Convergence’ as currently practiced, ie an attempt to harmonise IFRS with
US accounting standards, should be downgraded from its current priority
status. Not doing so entails the risk of compromising standards quality from
the point of view of users of financial information. High standards quality,
rather than ad hoc harmonisation, is the condition for eventual IFRS adoption
by the US, Japan, and other jurisdictions that still use national standards.
• The foundation’s Trustees need to significantly increase their level of
presence and engagement in public debates about accounting and
interaction with policymakers.
This Policy Contribution reproduces the text of a letter sent on 7 December 2009
to the Chairman of the IASC Foundation in response to the Foundation’s public
consultation on Part 2 of its Constitution Review.
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IFRS SUSTAINABILITY REQUIRES FURTHER
GOVERNANCE REFORM 
NICOLAS VÉRON,DECEMBER 2009
To: Mr Gerrit Zalm
Chairman of the Trustees,
International Accounting Standards Committee
Foundation (IASCF),
30 Cannon Street,
London EC4M 6XH,
United Kingdom
Re: Comment Letter – IASC Foundation
Constitution Review, Part 2
Dear Mr Zalm
I appreciate the opportunity to comment on Part
2 of the ongoing Constitution Review of the IASC
Foundation, including the consultation document
titled Proposals for Enhanced Public Accountabil-
ity and published by the Foundation on Septem-
ber 9, 2009. Furthermore I apologise for sending
this letter a week later than the consultation dead-
line of 30 November, and am thankful for the ex-
tension that was granted to me in this.
I am a resident scholar at Bruegel, a European
think tank that started operations in Brussels in
2005 with the support of a number of European
member state governments (including, at the
time, the Netherlands under your leadership of the
Finance Ministry) and international companies.
Bruegel’s aim is to contribute to the quality of eco-
nomic policymaking in Europe through open, fact-
based and policy-relevant research, analysis and
discussion. I am also a member of the CFA Insti-
tute’s Corporate Disclosure Policy Council and of
the International Corporate Governance Network’s
Accounting and Auditing Practices Committee. In
the latter capacity I participated in the Constitu-
tion Review Round Table meeting organised by the
Foundation in London on September 9, 2009, and
expressed views on behalf of the ICGN. However,
this letter represents my personal views and not
those of the ICGN or, for that matter, those of
Bruegel as an organisation.
Accounting standard-setting is a topic to which I
have devoted significant attention since 2002. I
believe that my Bruegel work, occasional private
consulting activity, and non-profit activities do not
introduce any commercial or special-interest bias
to my views nor do they impair the integrity of my
research. 
THE NEED FOR STRATEGIC READJUSTMENT
After a string of remarkable successes since
2000, the IASC Foundation has encountered
mounting challenges in the ongoing financial cri-
sis, which it has generally not met with apparent
success. Beyond the very public controversy over
fair value accounting, which is not specific to IFRS
and has its echo in the domestic US context, a
number of negative developments have occurred.
They include, on the standard-setting side, the
forced publication in October 2008 of a rule on re-
classifications that is widely considered as de-
creasing reporting quality, and the failure to reach
a joint approach with FASB on financial instru-
ments in July 2009; on the international recogni-
tion side, the refusal of the European Commission
to consider adoption of IFRS 9 in 2009, and in the
US the likely delaying by the SEC of eventual IFRS
adoption milestones; and on the governance side,
the rushed creation in 2008-09 of a Monitoring
Board whose design was widely criticised in the
global investment community, then the refusal so
far of the European Commission to participate in
the Monitoring Group once created.
In this context, the confidence that the IASC Foun-
dation attracts from its stakeholders and espe-
cially the global investment community appears
to be at a low point, while the prospect of its‘The crisis has revealed the magnitude of the strategic challenges faced by the Foundation. The
Foundation’s performance in meeting these has been questionable, in spite of a number of
helpful initiatives such as the establishment of the Financial Crisis Advisory Group.’
Nicolas Véron IFRS SUSTAINABILITY REQUIRES FURTHER GOVERNANCE REFORM
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capture by national or regional political interests
has perhaps never seemed so threatening.
This challenging situation can be attributed both
to the intrinsic political difficulty of the IFRS proj-
ect, which the favourable market conditions of
2000-2007 had somewhat masked, and to spe-
cific decisions (or the absence thereof) by the
Trustees and the IASB, both before and after the
start of crisis. On the one hand, the crisis has re-
vealed the magnitude of the strategic challenges
faced by the Foundation. On the other hand, the
Foundation’s performance in meeting these chal-
lenges has been questionable, thus compounding
its current difficulties, and in spite of a number of
helpful initiatives such as the establishment of
the Financial Crisis Advisory Group.
As a consequence, it is appropriate for the IASC
Foundation to consider a strategic readjustment.
This does not necessarily imply a dramatic
change of course or a reversal of decisions made
already. But the situation calls for the Foundation
to chart a clear course to overcome the mounting
obstacles it faces, and perhaps also envisage
changes in leadership. Trying to just muddle
through will lead to ever-larger problems which
may eventually call into question the continued
existence of the IFRS project itself.
As many of the current difficulties are of a prima-
rily political nature, the Constitution Review is the
right time to engineer such a strategic readjust-
ment, and put IFRS standard-setting back on a
sustainable track. However, Constitution changes
only make sense as part of a broader, consistent
vision. Two broad related themes, summarised
under the labels ‘Governance’ and ‘Convergence’,
are considered in the following comments, each of
which has implications in terms of potential Con-
stitutional changes. A number of recommenda-
tions are then drawn from this analysis, including
specific comments on the IASC Foundation’s con-
sultation document. 
READJUSTING GOVERNANCE
The IASC Foundation was set up without a clear in-
dication of who its ultimate stakeholders are. Its
first Trustees were appointed by an ad hoc com-
mittee and subsequent appointments were made
by existing Trustees. Funding has been similarly
ad hoc in the first years, and since 2006 has mi-
grated towards a country-based system with wide
variations among countries as to who the local
funders are. The Constitution itself does not artic-
ulate specifically on whose behalf the Foundation
is designed to work. The claims of “public ac-
countability” in the Constitution Review consulta-
tion document are similarly vague.
In the discussion document for Part 1 of the Con-
stitution Review (July 2008), it is mentioned that
the Trustees “implemented regular meetings with
various interested external parties, including pub-
lic officials and business, investor and account-
ancy organisations” (page 6); that “the Trustees
met prominent stakeholders from around the
wor[l]d with an interest in accounting standard-
setting, including regulators, accounting and busi-
ness organisations, and the Standards Advisory
Council” (page 7); and that “the Trustees have
identified stakeholder groups with which they
maintain regular contact and are establishing
mechanisms to receive input outside formal con-
sultations. These stakeholder groups include offi-
cial organisations, policymakers, investor groups
and private sector institutions from around the
world” (page 9). The consultation document for
Part 2 of the Consultation Review refers to “the
need to demonstrate the organisation’s public ac-
countability and to be open to dialogue with all
stakeholders” (page 4) but is even less specific
than in Part 1 about who these stakeholders are.
This question of stakeholder identification is be-
coming crucial as IFRS gain ground and are in-
creasingly endorsed around the world, a
consequence of which is that the IASB finds itselfIFRS SUSTAINABILITY REQUIRES FURTHER GOVERNANCE REFORMNicolas Véron
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subject to much more pressure from competing
special interests than was the case before 2002,
and that the need to differentiate among these
competing interests becomes more pressing.
On the face of it, investors would seem to be the
natural “priority stakeholders” for the Foundation.
In a Statement on Principles of 22 September
2009, the IASCF’s Monitoring Board wrote: “We
view the primary objective of financial reporting
as being to provide information on an entity’s fi-
nancial performance in a way that is useful for de-
cision-making for present and potential
investors”. The IASB’s own conceptual framework,
in its current wording dating from the late 1980s,
states that “While all of the information needs of
these users [as previously listed: investors, em-
ployees, lenders, suppliers and other trade credi-
tors, customers, governments and their agencies,
and the public] cannot be met by financial state-
ments, there are needs which are common to all
users. As investors are providers of risk capital to
the enterprise, the provision of financial state-
ments that meet their needs will also meet most
of the needs of other users that financial state-
ments can satisfy” (Section 10).
There are however obstacles to the empowerment
of investors, or more generally of users of finan-
cial information, as the Foundation’s primary
stakeholders. The global investment community
is very fragmented and is not as well represented
by industry bodies as are other business cate-
gories, in spite of the constructive efforts played in
that sense by, among others, the CFA Institute, the
International Corporate Governance Network, and,
in the US, the Council of Institutional Investors. In
many jurisdictions, including several major EU
countries, a critical number of large investment
players are themselves a part of diversified finan-
cial services firms whose interests as issuers may
prevail over their views as investors in accounting
debates. Meanwhile, many firms with investment
arms, including many mutual fund managers, in-
surance companies, or investment banks, often
have large issuers as major clients and are there-
fore wary of expressing views in public discus-
sions that may run counter to those clients’ policy
positions. Thus, the representation of the global
investment community remains underdeveloped
in accounting policy debates.
But this does not imply that the IASC Foundation
should renounce putting investors (and other
users) at the centre of its governance framework.
On the contrary, being investor-centric is the only
way for the Foundation to ensure the sustainabil-
ity of IFRS, much the same way as companies
have to be customer-centric in order to compete
successfully. However, it does mean that the IASC
Foundation has itself to organise representation
of the global investment community for the pur-
poses of its own governance, rather than relying
on existing representative bodies. So far the Foun-
dation’s efforts in this have been extremely mod-
est and have sometimes appeared half-hearted.
Putting investors (back) at the core should be the
starting point of the Foundation’s needed gover-
nance adjustment.
In individual jurisdictions, the representation of in-
vestors and other users can be partly exercised
through public authorities that oversee standard-
setters and intervene in their governance on be-
half of the investing public. This is typically the
case in the US (through the Securities and Ex-
change Commission), Japan (through the Finan-
cial Services Agency), or the UK (through the
Financial Reporting Council). However, no such
arrangement is possible at global level as there is
no global public authority that could credibly play
a similar role. The claim in the current Constitution
(Article 18) that the relationship between the
Foundation and the newly established Monitoring
Board “seeks to replicate, on an international
basis, the link between accounting standard-set-
ters and those public authorities that have gener-
ally overseen accounting standard-setters” fails
to adequately recognise the simple and funda-
mental difference between national environments
and the global level, namely that there is no such
thing as a global government.
By reorienting its funding since 2006 towards a
country-based model in which funding decisions
are ultimately made by national governments
3. See for example the
Financial Times
editorial, “Lessons
learnt for capitalism’s
future”, 14 April 2009:
“The current mismatch
of globalised finance
and national
governance is
unsustainable. Either
governance becomes
more globalised or
finance less globalised”. 
4. See for example AFG and
FFSA, Investor Perspectives
on IFRS Implementation,
Paris, December 2007.
5. Donald Nicolaisen, “A
Securities Regulator
Looks at Convergence”,
Northwestern University
Journal of International
Law and Business, April
2005.
6. The Constitution
currently refers to “a
single set of high
quality, understandable
and enforceable global
accounting standards
that require high quality,
transparent and
comparable information
in financial statements
and other financial
reporting to help
participants in the
world’s capital markets
and other users make
economic decisions”
(Article 2).
7. Office of the SEC Chief Ac-
countant and SEC Divi-
sion of Corporation
Finance, “Report and
Recommendations Pur-
suant to Section 133 of
the Emergency Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act
of 2008: Study on Mark-
To-Market Accounting”,
December 2008
8. See Claudio Borio and
Kostas Tsatsaronis,
“Risk in financial report-
ing: status, challenges
and suggested direc-
tions”, Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements
Working Paper No 213,
August 2006Nicolas Véron IFRS SUSTAINABILITY REQUIRES FURTHER GOVERNANCE REFORM
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(and the European Union), and by empowering in
early 2009 a Monitoring Board composed of na-
tional (or in the case of the European Commission,
regional) authorities, the Foundation is following a
track that may lead it ultimately to be governed as
a traditional treaty-based international organisa-
tion, such as the specialised agencies of the
United Nations. However, for the same reasons
that have led most developed countries to out-
source accounting standard-setting to specialised
bodies that rely largely on private-sector re-
sources, the gradual introduction of an “UN-like”
funding and governance framework for IFRS stan-
dard-setting involves a significant risk of political
capture and poor technical outcomes. In any case,
it is highly unlikely that such a framework for over-
sight of IFRS standard-setting could adequately
represent the global investment community in a
sustainable manner. 
READJUSTING CONVERGENCE
The objective to develop “a single set of high qual-
ity, understandable and enforceable global ac-
counting standards” (Article 2(a) of the current
Constitution) has given rise to efforts to seek ‘con-
vergence’ between IFRS and the most important
and influential sets of national accounting stan-
dards. Convergence is specifically mentioned as
an objective in itself in Article 2(d) of the current
Constitution. In practice, convergence efforts have
been essentially focused on the United States,
with a minor secondary focus on Japan. Conver-
gence with US GAAP has been enshrined in the so-
called Norwalk Agreement of September 2002
between FASB and the IASB and in Memorandums
of Understanding (MoUs) in 2006 and 2008, as
well as a recent joint statement issued in Novem-
ber 2009. The aim of convergence was solemnly
reaffirmed and endorsed in the Pittsburgh summit
statement of G20 country leaders, whose section
relating to accounting standard-setting (item 14)
reads as follows: “We call on our international ac-
counting bodies to redouble their efforts to
achieve a single set of high quality, global ac-
counting standards within the context of their in-
dependent standard setting process, and
complete their convergence project by June 2011.
The International Accounting Standards Board’s
(IASB) institutional framework should further en-
hance the involvement of various stakeholders”.
However, there are worrying signs that the con-
vergence effort between IFRS and US GAAP, as
currently practiced, may have become counter-
productive from the point of view of standards
quality, and of long-term IFRS acceptance. My as-
sessment is that a growing number of observers
in the policy, auditing and investment communi-
ties are viewing the current IFRS-US GAAP conver-
gence process as increasingly akin to a race to the
bottom rather than to the top. Specifically, the IFRS
8 standard on operating segments, one of the first
to follow the February 2006 MoU, was adopted by
the IASB (and subsequently by the EU) against
considerable opposition from the global invest-
ment community1. Later, the emphasis placed on
a convergent approach for the crucial issue of fi-
nancial instruments accounting (which in IFRS
terms corresponds to the replacement of IAS 39)
was called into question by the rushed adoption
on 13 October 2008 of an amendment to IAS 39
permitting reclassifications, without apparent co-
ordination with FASB and against the near-unani-
mous opposition of the global investment
community, and by the publication in July 2009
of divergent visions on financial instruments ac-
counting by the IASB and FASB respectively. Si-
multaneously, the prospect of US adoption of IFRS
for domestic issuers, which may have seemed
tantalisingly close in 2008 when the SEC was
chaired by Christopher Cox, is now becoming more
remote, and the same is true of Japan as regards
mandatory IFRS adoption.
In the light of these developments and the current
‘There are worrying signs that the IFRS-US GAAP convergence effort could be counter-productive
for standards quality, and for long-term IFRS acceptance. The process is increasingly viewed as a
race to the bottom rather than to the top.’
1. This point is specifically
documented in “EU
Adoption of the IFRS 8
Standard on Operating
Segments”, Note for the
ECON Committee of the
European Parliament, 21
September 2007, published
in the Bruegel Policy
Contribution series and
available on
www.bruegel.org.IFRS SUSTAINABILITY REQUIRES FURTHER GOVERNANCE REFORMNicolas Véron
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dynamics in key jurisdictions, the IASC Founda-
tion should seriously explore to what extent con-
vergence as currently practised is compatible with
its other objectives. It seems natural for the Foun-
dation to continue seeking eventual IFRS adoption
by the US and Japan as a key aim. However, IFRS
adoption for the US is not directly comparable to
what it has been or is in other jurisdictions, in
which IFRS were widely seen as of generally equal
or higher quality than the local standards they
were to replace. While Enron and other accounting
scandals have raised doubts about the reliability
of US GAAP, there are indications that many stake-
holders of the US investment community are con-
cerned that IFRS adoption may carry the risk of a
decrease in quality, both in terms of the content
of existing standards and, perhaps even more im-
portantly, in terms of the future standard-setting
process. Thus, it may be the case that the bar to
be reached for IFRS adoption to become possible
in the US is higher than the milestones set by the
current convergence programme under the FASB-
IASB MoUs, which may themselves prove imprac-
tical and unachievable within the G20-endorsed
completion deadline of mid-2011.
Thus, the Foundation may consider adjusting its
strategy for enabling eventual IFRS adoption in the
US, Japan, and other jurisdictions which have not
yet (or not fully) adopted them. Instead of an
alignment between IFRS and US GAAP (or Japan-
ese standards), which may have become unreal-
istic and counterproductive, the aim would be to
make IFRS of sufficiently high intrinsic quality so
that key US and Japanese constituents, first and
foremost the investment community, would no
longer resist but on the contrary would advocate
their mandatory use.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE TRUSTEES
These recommendations follow the above devel-
oped analysis.
• Timing and process:the changes envisaged in
Part 2 of the Constitution Review are not ambi-
tious enough to meet the expectations and re-
quirements of the current moment of IFRS
development. Thus, the Trustees should open a
Part 3 of the Constitution Review immediately
after the completion of Part 2 (just as Part 2 fol-
lowed Part 1, or to be more accurate was
started just before the completion of Part 1).
This Part 3 should be primarily about how to
make the IFRS Foundation (if this new name is
adopted) more investor-centric and should in-
clude the consideration of significant changes
to both the Monitoring Board and the funding
framework.
• Representation and participation of the global
investment community:In Part 3, the Trustees
should aim at the building of appropriate mech-
anisms for the representation and participation
of the global investment community and of
other users of financial information, both within
a transformed Monitoring Board (or a body or
bodies to which the Trustees would become ac-
countable and that would replace the Monitor-
ing Board) and in the Foundation’s funding
framework, for which the Trustees may return
to an at least partly transnational (as opposed
to country-based) approach. As no obvious
precedent exists, the Trustees may adopt an ex-
perimental and perhaps phased approach to
reach the aim of making their organisation ulti-
mately accountable to the global investment
community, while simultaneously keeping or
developing accountability channels towards
national governments and the EU. Specifically,
the Trustees may consider integrating the rele-
vant provisions relating to funding in the frame-
work of the Constitution. 
• Part 2 amendments:as previously stated, Part
2 as outlined in the consultation document is
not ambitious enough to provide an appropriate
‘the IASC Foundation should seriously explore to what extent convergence as currently practised
is compatible with its other objectives. In the US, many stakeholders are concerned that IFRS
adoption may carry the risk of a decrease in quality.’Nicolas Véron IFRS SUSTAINABILITY REQUIRES FURTHER GOVERNANCE REFORM
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response to current challenges as regards the
Foundation’s Constitution. However, some of
the proposed changes could be adopted by the
Trustees in this phase: 
o The suggested changes of names (IFRS,
IFRS Board, IFRS Foundation; Questions 1
and 2of the consultation document) repre-
sent a significant and helpful streamlining
of the current terminology, and should be
adopted expeditiously. The sometimes
heard argument that ‘IASB’ is an established
brand whose value should not be lost fails to
recognise how confusing the current ‘alpha-
bet soup’ is for third parties which are not fa-
miliar with accounting standard-setting
intricacies. 
o The changes to the Foundation’s objectives
as expressed in the Constitution’s Article 2
(Question 3) merit further debate and this
topic should be shifted to Part 3 in order to
be made consistent with the broader strate-
gic readjustment advocated above, as well
as with the still ongoing rewriting of the
IASB’s conceptual framework. As regards the
proposed changes, the following three re-
marks apply. First, in (a), the adjective ‘ac-
ceptable’ should be preferred to ‘accepted’
as this item should not refer to the actual
adoption of the standards, only to their de-
velopment by the IASB. Second, in (c), the
notion of ‘emerging economies’ as a distinct
category is arguably outdated and should be
replaced by a broader reference to the diver-
sity of the world’s economies. Third, consis-
tent with the above remarks on
convergence, the entire item (d) could be
deleted as convergence should not be an ob-
jective of the same order as (a), (b) and (c). 
o The reference to the Trustees as the body
where the Foundation’s governance rests
‘primarily’ (Question 4) is of doubtful signif-
icance, as it is arguably incompatible with
the currently applicable MoU between the
Foundation and the Monitoring Board. The
suggested amendment is therefore not ‘clar-
ifying’ and should not be adopted. 
o The widening of the geographical scope on
the basis of which the Trustees shall be
selected (Question 5) is welcome. However,
it remains ad hoc, with no clarity as to the
underlying principles of representation. A
better alternative would be to specify ac-
cording to which objective criteria the geo-
graphical balance within the Trustees should
be established and regularly updated. Such
criteria may include, for example, a combi-
nation of respective regions’ population and
measures of GDP and/or savings and/or
market capitalisation. 
o The proposed accelerated due process
(Question 11) rests on no compelling case
and is likely to lead to a decrease in the qual-
ity of standards and a diminution of trust in
IFRS on the part of the global investment
community, as was the case in October
2008. The proposed amendment should be
rejected by the Trustees. 
o I have no particular comments on the other
questions raised in the consultation docu-
ment. 
• Trustee engagement in the public debate: Irre-
spective of what changes are made to the Con-
stitution, it would be in the interest of the
Foundation and of the IFRS project that
Trustees engage much more in the public de-
bate than has been the case since the begin-
ning of the crisis. The spirit of the Foundation’s
constitutional framework that has been in
place since 2001 is that the Trustees should
protect the integrity and independence of the
standard-setting process by taking the lead as
regards the governance and funding of the en-
tire standard-setting organisation. Instead, in
the past two years it has been the Chairman of
the IASB, rather than the Trustees, who has
‘Irrespective of what changes are made to the Constitution, it would be in the interest of the
Foundation and of the IFRS project that Trustees engage much more in the public debate than
has been the case since the beginning of the crisis.’IFRS SUSTAINABILITY REQUIRES FURTHER GOVERNANCE REFORMNicolas Véron
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been most visibly present in meetings with pol-
icymakers as well as in the public debate to ex-
plain and defend the Foundation’s governance
framework and accountability. Though the IASB
Chairman is a widely recognised and respected
figure, this is an unsustainable pattern that
should be remedied through significantly en-
hanced public engagement by the Trustees
themselves. 
In this spirit, the Trustees may also consider
whether the position of their Chair should become
a full-time assignment, as is the case in many
comparable organisations. The same considera-
tions would justify further clarifying the respec-
tive scope of the Foundation and the IASB by re-
moving the mention in the Constitution that the
IASB Chair should simultaneously be chief execu-
tive of the Foundation, as has been advocated by
other respondents. 
Yours sincerely, 
Nicolas Véron
Senior Fellow, Bruegel
n.veron@bruegel.org • +32 473 815 372